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ABSTRACT 
In this interview, Terry Flew discusses the continued relevance of the nation-state and 
national media systems in an era of globalization, and the need for cross-national comparative 
research in media studies. He also discusses the benefits of the concepts of ‘voice’ and 
‘participation’ over ‘citizenship’ for evaluating media systems, and criticises the overblown 
and dismissive use of ‘neoliberalism’ as a rhetorical flourish, in favour of developing it as an 
analytical concept grounded in empirical evidence. Drawing on Foucault’s work on both 
Weber and neoliberalism, Flew argues, helps us recognise the need for comparative work on 
institutions and national systems of government. 
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SIMON DAWES: You’ve recently (Flew & Waisbord 2015; Flew et. al., 2016) criticised 
claims that media globalization is weakening the relevance of nation-states, and argued for the 
continuing centrality of nation-states to media processes and the ongoing significance of 
national space, as well as the continued relevance of Hallin & Mancini’s model of media 
systems. To what extent can such a position be reconciled with an acknowledgment of the 
impact of transnational forces within national media institutions, policies and cultures?  
 
TERRY FLEW: Media globalization is certainly one of a number of forces impacting upon 
20
th
 century models of media policy. Platform convergence, the rise of digital platforms that 
are not themselves commissioners or creators of content, and user-created content are among 
others reshaping media policy worldwide. My point would be that the impact of media 
globalisation on nation-states depends to a degree upon what kinds of state we are talking 
about. Where states are strong, transnational forces are to a degree subordinate to national 
governments: China is the obvious case in point here. More generally, insofar as profitability 
in media industries hinges upon privileged forms of access to certain kinds of audiences, 
transnational media companies face the challenge of how to deal with national governments, 
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particularly where they are in competition with incumbents with a long history of engagement 
in these political cultures, and where politicians – particularly in Europe – are inclined to want 
to promote their ‘national champions’, to deal with ‘the threat of Google’ and other perceived 
threats from outside of their borders. So political, economic and cultural nationalisms remain 
relevant in the world that faces global media companies.  
 
 
 
SIMON DAWES: You’ve argued for the need for more cross-national comparative research 
in media studies. You’re critical, however, of comparative studies that remain largely 
descriptive, and which are primarily interested in understanding national differences, rather 
than developing alternative explanations and theories. How can the more reflexive 
comparative research that you encourage help us move beyond the replication of the scholarly 
priorities of UK and US researchers? 
 
TERRY FLEW: Comparative research is necessary because we bring many unconscious 
biases to media research. For example, most Internet users in the world deal with an Internet 
that is considerably more governed than discourses that are informed by the First Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution would have you believe. But what is needed is not a descriptive 
comparativism; how many smart phones are there in, say, India, as compared to Indonesia. 
The point is that there are a lot in both countries, and what we need to understand are the 
resulting socio-cultural shifts. Getting a greater global plurality of perspectives requires 
engaging with the global political-economy of scholarly publishing, which remains dominated 
by the U.S. and the English-speaking world. The global movement of graduate students is also 
a relevant factor here.  
 
 
 
 
SIMON DAWES: Australia has had a dual broadcasting system since the inception of 
broadcasting, and currently has one of most concentrated newspaper systems in the 
democratic world (Flew 2013). How would you summarise the differences between 
Australian and UK media systems – in terms of market competition, concentration and 
plurality, the promotion of core social democratic values through regulation, and the influence 
of Rupert Murdoch? 
 
TERRY FLEW: Rupert Murdoch’s influence over Australian politics is MUCH greater than 
that of the UK. In the 2013 Federal election, Murdoch’s newspapers universally ran an anti-
Labor line, and there was a very close relationship between former Prime Minister Tony 
Abbott and the Murdoch editors and columnists. My point would be that this generates far 
less influence over political debate than was the case 30 years ago. Newspaper circulations are 
a fraction of what they once were, and people access political information from a multiplicity 
of online and social media sources. Also, at least in Australia, the political leadership cycle is 
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far more brutal than it once was. When the former Liberal leader, Tony Abbott, lost popular 
support, all the favourable columns in Murdoch newspapers could not put that back together.  
 
Australian governments have long restricted competition in broadcasting, in part so that 
profitable commercial networks would reinvest these profits in local production. This has 
been done not only with the support of governments from both sides of politics, but with the 
tacit support of much of the local production industry. Policy measures that opened up the 
broadcasting market would threaten that particular quid pro quo between the commercial 
networks and the local production industry. When the Productivity Commission questioned 
both the desirability and sustainability of this back in 2000 (Productivity Commission 2000), 
their arguments were largely howled down by the sector itself, and the Howard government – 
in spite of its alleged neoliberalism – quickly buried this outline of an agenda for more 
market-oriented reforms of Australian media policy. Now that OTT (over-the-top) services 
like Netflix are challenging the dominance of the networks anyway, the question of how best 
to support local production is likely to be revisited. My point would be that a more 
competitive market does not necessarily deliver to cultural progressives the things they also 
desire, such as continued investment in local content or children’s programming.  
 
 
 
SIMON DAWES: Like Nick Couldry (2010), you have also (2009) drawn on Albert 
Hirschmann to argue that a focus on “voice” and “participation” is a less problematic 
alternative to normative applications of “citizenship” as an evaluative framework, although 
you recognise that notions of citizenship have been implicit throughout the development of 
broadcasting policy since its inception. Could you say a little more about the problems you 
have with the tendency, particularly among British scholars, to present “citizen” and 
“consumer” as alternative discursive positions, to present citizenship in normative terms, and 
to retrofit a citizenship discourse onto earlier media institutions? 
 
TERRY FLEW: Nick Couldry has done media studies a great service in drawing attention to 
Albert Hirschmann’s concept of ‘voice’, in his 1970 book Exit, Voice and Loyalty. What 
Hirschmann does is bring out the extent to which a political and participatory logic towards 
social institutions, captured in the concept of ‘voice’, co-exists with the more strictly 
economic logic of ‘exit’. Hirschmann also identified the extent to which systems based 
entirely upon ‘exit’, or upon consumer choice as the primary means of registering decisions, 
can generate their own contradictory consequences. This was 20 years before we started to be 
clear about the practical limits of privatising forms of public infrastructure such as rail 
networks and energy utilities, which was the risk of simply replacing imperfect public 
monopolies with private monopolies that had no public accountability.   
 
In response to the question, the risk in using ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ is that you simply take them as 
being synonymous with ‘private’ and ‘public’. There are very interesting forms of consumer 
activism that engage around markets and citizenship, that range from ethical investment to 
divestment campaigns, to some forms of food activism. At the same time, the line between 
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commercial and state-run can be drawn too neatly with regards to media. There is certainly a 
history of commercial media engaging in programming that has citizenship dimensions. In 
Australia, for example, the mini-series functioned as a kind of historical story-telling medium 
for a mass audience. At the same time, our public service media are not averse to content 
decisions that seek to maximise audiences. Watching BBC1 on any given night of the week, I 
would suggest there are a whole range of programs whose claims to being concerned with 
citizenship are very thin. They are popular programs aimed at mass audiences. 
 
So perhaps we need to accept that social institutions, both public and private, are complex 
assemblages that require detailed historical and institutional analysis.  Simply saying that 
institutional form X only engages with people as consumers, whereas Y only engages with 
them as citizens, is a simplistic dualism that scholarly work in the field needs to get beyond.  
 
 
 
SIMON DAWES: Pointing to a lack of convergence even within countries of the same media 
system, you dismiss the argument that there has been a global trend of policy convergence 
across national media systems. You also argue that “neoliberalism” (as a political ideology) 
does not sufficiently explain global policy trends, and that neoliberalism is no more a 
hegemonic influence on public policy than national or state capitalism. You accept that the 
term can, however, help explain certain trends in the US and the UK – but only ‘debatably’. 
To what extent do you think that neoliberalism does not convincingly explain, for instance, 
trends in UK broadcasting policy over the past few decades? 
 
TERRY FLEW: According to the BBC series Masters of Money, Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher used to keep quotes from Freidrich von Hayek on pieces of paper in her handbag, 
and would refer to them in Cabinet meetings when she felt that her Ministerial colleagues 
were deviating too much from the true path. That is what a dedication to implementing 
neoliberalism in public life looks like! 
 
The use of the term in academic circles has now, however, become so sloppy that I think there 
is a danger in continuing to see it as a core analytical category. It is routinely invoked to 
explain everything from the rise of Bollywood themed weddings to competitive cooking 
shows to university departmental restructurings. In public discourse, it has become an ill-
defined abuse term. In the UK, for instance, there is a healthy coterie of commenters on The 
Guardian’s online comments section for whom anyone who expresses a view that positions 
them at odds with Jeremy Corbyn is, by definition, a neoliberal. In debating the uses and 
abuses of this term with an academic colleague in the humanities recently, I found that his 
view – and he is an internationally well-known cultural studies theorist – was that anyone who 
did not believe that neoliberalism was the dominant ideology of our times was an agent of 
neoliberal ideology, since disavowal of neoliberalism was the surest sign of a neoliberal. The 
propensity of all of this to lapse into a kind of conspiracy theory is readily apparent. 
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It is also not a particularly important animating principle for media policy. It could be: if, for 
instance, we completely removed broadcasting licencing systems and privatised the BBC, that 
would certainly be a neoliberal direction in media policy in the UK. But most policy makers 
around the world are approaching media policy reform far more cautiously than this. We also 
need to be cautious about framing policy discourses too readily within a neoliberal/anti-
neoliberal frame. In the UK, the question of whether licence fees can continue to fund the 
BBC into the future is a real one, and it is not necessarily ‘neoliberal’ to question both the 
equity and the sustainability of the current arrangements.  
 
The final point is that much of the world does not work along these lines. In its adoption of a 
market economy, China has not furthered political liberalisation at all: liberalism is a 
historically weak force in China, and the Communist Party of China repeatedly positions 
liberalism as a threat to the Chinese nation. Putin’s Russia would appear to be increasingly a 
state capitalist system. The developmental state models of East Asia have always supported 
pragmatic state interventions in the underlying economic structure.  
 
 
 
SIMON DAWES: In recent years (2012; 2014; 2015), you have been focusing on Foucault’s 
lectures on neoliberalism, and engaging with the theoretical debates on how best to 
understand neoliberalism. You’ve criticised the tendency of many scholars to use the term as 
a conceptual trash-can, “…into which anything and everything can be dumped, as long as it is 
done so with suitable moral vehemence”, and written about the need to “rescue’ the concept 
from the most vocal moral critics of markets and economic discourse, whom you accuse of 
producing functionalist and instrumentalist accounts of the state. Is the way in which critical 
scholars use the term ‘neoliberalism’ beginning to change?  
 
TERRY FLEW: Michel Foucault’s lectures at the College de France in 1978-79, published 
in English in 2008 as The Birth of Biopolitics, were very important in giving the concept of 
neoliberalism some analytical rigour. Rather than just being an abuse term, that critical 
humanities scholars came to do to denounce anything to do with economics and markets, 
neoliberalism was now being seen as part of an important historical moment, where 
economists associated with the ‘Austrian School’ (led by Hayek, and inspired by von Mises 
and Schumpeter) and the ‘Chicago School’ (Milton Friedman, George Stigler etc.), as well as 
the ‘Virginia School’ of James Buchanan and the ‘public choice’ theorists, were turning their 
critique of Keynesian economics and government intervention into markets into a wider set of 
ideas about the relationship between political economy and social order. Rather ingeniously, 
Foucault proposes that post-WWII (West) Germany provided a policy test-bed for some of 
these ideas, such as ‘positive’ welfare (i.e. the purpose of welfare is not poverty alleviation, 
but getting people back into the workforce), prioritising monetary policy and low inflation 
over full employment, and the idea of an ‘enterprise society’.  
 
The late translation of Foucault’s lectures into English has had some interesting 
consequences. Their publication in 2008 coincided with a global financial crisis that many 
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blamed on the deregulation of financial markets since the 1980s, and an associated rise in 
both consumer debt and risky lending by financial institutions. It has been followed by 
important critiques of global capitalism coming from relatively mainstream economists, such 
as Thomas Piketty with his voluminous and very data-driven Capital in the Twenty-First 
Century (Piketty, 2014). So talk about neoliberalism has been moving beyond being 
essentially a rhetorical flourish – akin to calling something ‘petty bourgeois’ or calling 
someone a ‘Red Tory’– to appearing as a sound analytical concept grounded in empirical 
evidence.  
 
 
 
SIMON DAWES: You’ve also been critical of some accounts of neoliberalism that present a 
trouble-free amalgamation of Foucault’s ideas into a generic, neo-Marxist narrative of 
neoliberalism as a dominant ideology of global capitalism. You see such attempts as 
remaining within the binary oppositions of public and private, collective and individual, and 
state and market, that Foucauldian research problematises. However, do you think that a 
theoretical-methodological rapprochement (such as that attempted by Jamie Peck 2013) 
between Marxist and Foucauldian accounts of neoliberalism is possible – recognising it as a 
series of changing techniques of government, for example, while also accounting for the 
influence of private interests and offering a critique of multiple forms of power – or do you 
(like Stephen Collier 2012) see them as mutually exclusive? 
 
TERRY FLEW: There is a certain irony in saying that one has to view Michel Foucault as a 
man of his times, given his own pronouncements about the death of the author! But it is 
important to understand how his work evolved in a kind of critical dialogue with the 
predominantly Marxist milieu of philosophy and social theory in post-war France. In 
particular, he railed against the “official Marxism” represented by the Communist Party of 
France (PCF), with which he had a brief and unhappy relationship. Throughout his work, you 
can find a critique of three core tenets of Marxian orthodoxy: that the left can transform 
power in all of its dimensions by virtue of capturing control over the state and its institutional 
apparatuses; that the mass of people live under a kind of false consciousness derived from 
capitalist ideology, which prevents them from understanding their ‘true’ interests; and that the 
fundamental antagonism of capitalist societies is between bosses and workers. With the ‘left’ 
critique of the PCF associated with the May 1968 uprisings, Foucault found a natural affinity 
with the new social movements who were also critical of such orthodoxies. 
 
By the mid 1970s, however, that moment had exhausted itself, and Foucault’s 1978-79 
lectures at the College de France are situated in that changed context. The lectures continue 
his thematic interest in governmentality, or the ‘minor’ strategies and tactics of power 
associated with governmental institutions that occur below the surface of the state and the 
political leadership: the ‘King’ whose head needed to be ‘cut off’ in order to better understand 
what he termed the microphysics of power. At several points he rails against the ‘state phobia’ 
and ‘paranoiac thinking’ of the ultra-left, arguing that liberal modes of government actually 
seek to reduce the power of the state, or at least to disperse its operations through the social 
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body. It is this which he argues that the neo-liberal theorists have understood better than the 
Marxists, that ‘reason of state’ is the more effective the more it can operate through civil 
society and through individuals themselves, rather than be imposed from above. 
Contemporary variants of such thinking can be found in behavioural economics and so-called 
‘nudge theory’.  
 
At the same time, he was also sceptical about the ‘Common Program’ that had been adopted 
by the Socialist Party (PS) and the PCF. This program, which formed the basis for an uneasy 
alliance among the two leading parties of the left, set out a programmatic statement of what a 
government of the left needed to do if they came to power, and was seen by the PCF in 
particular as heralding a transition from capitalism to socialism, involving the nationalisation 
of the largest companies, comprehensive economic planning etc. His commentary on this is 
more indirect, but links to his propositions that power is not simply something held in the 
state apparatuses, or located in the economic base. He observes that what is missing here is an 
‘art of government’, or what he describes as ‘a reasonable and calculable measure of the 
extent, modes, and objectives of governmental action’ (Foucault 2008, pp. 91-92). Again he 
thinks that the left can learn from the neoliberals, but in this instance it is about how to align 
philosophical ideals with practical programs of government. He is critiquing the left for its 
focus on doctrinal conformity (e.g. how many companies should be nationalised – 50, 
250 ???), and arguing that the neoliberals have a better understanding of change as a process, 
embedded in the practical tasks of government. In other words, the left needs to be less 
‘textualist’ and more pragmatic. 
 
The question now, of course, is whether he implicitly endorsed the sort of government 
through the market, audit culture, enterprise culture etc. that we associated with neoliberal 
modes of government in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. This is debated at length in the 
recent collection edited by Daniel Zamora and Michael Behrent, titled Foucault and 
Neoliberalism (Zamora 2015). Given the time at which Foucault was presenting these lectures 
– 1978 in France – it is amazing that he was not looking at what was going on across the 
channel with the rise of Margaret Thatcher to power in the U.K. Thatcher would give concrete 
form to many of the ideas that largely existed at the level of speculation in late 1970s France. 
He was probably overly sanguine about government through the market, with his by then 
largely residual anti-statism coming up against a political position that was at the time of his 
death closer to Scandinavian social democracy than anything else. Had he lived into the 
1990s, he may have become a “Third Way” theorist !  But such speculation serves little 
purpose: the main point would be that he pursued a critique of Marxism from the perspective 
of someone who understood the theory well, and this makes it difficult to synthesise 
Foucault’s work into neo-Marxist theories of hegemony along the lines that this question 
proposes.  
 
 
 
SIMON DAWES: While others have debated the extent to which Foucault’s reading of 
neoliberalism is compatible with a Marxist approach or even critique more generally, you’ve 
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recently (2014; 2015) teased out the Weberian influence on Foucault’s lectures on 
neoliberalism, linking Foucault’s account of historical change to Weber’s work on the 
economic sociology of national capitalisms. How can linking Foucault and Weber help us 
understand neoliberalism, as well as contribute to the kind of reflexive comparative analysis 
of national media systems that you advocate? 
 
TERRY FLEW: There is a lot of talk about convergence in media studies. We largely use 
the term to discuss technological convergence, and related developments like industry 
convergence (the rise of Google, Facebook, etc. and their challenge to traditional media 
giants), textual convergence (e.g. transmedia storytelling) and content convergence around 
digital platforms. But implicit in theories of neoliberalism is the idea that we are experiencing 
greater policy convergence, and that the world is shifting from models of media regulation 
with a high role of government involvement towards deregulation, privatisation of public 
broadcasters, and the marketisation of access to media content. It is also proposed that media 
globalisation is making the study of comparative media systems redundant, as increasingly 
mobile and diasporic populations use new technologies to access content from around the 
globe, and are less and less anchored to territorially-defined national media systems.  
 
One of the interesting things about Max Weber’s work, and Foucault’s use of Weber, is that it 
reasserts the need for comparative work on institutions and national systems of government. 
The arguments that ‘the history of capitalism can only be an economic-institutional history’ 
(Foucault 2008, p. 162), and that legal relations are not the consequence of economic relations 
but are in fact foundational to economic relations – a proposition that goes back to Emile 
Durkheim, and has been a staple of economic sociology since Max Weber and Karl Polanyi – 
bring a new understanding to media policy that avoids simply seeing it as the by-product of a 
malign political ideology of global neoliberalism. A core concept of institutionalism is the 
idea of path dependency: the idea that institutional structures have histories that shape their 
responses to new developments, not least because an institution is a cultural as much as a 
social, political or economic entity, and that the way people think within institutions is shaped 
by that history. This implies that alongside the forces for policy convergence, such as 
international trade agreements or the ‘policy transfer’ of particular ideas and ideologies, we 
need to be noting the deep structure of institutional forms, and the informal institutions 
associated with values, customs, beliefs etc. that have long histories within nation-states, and 
continue to shape their political economies. The new institutional economists such as 
Douglass North, as well as critical economic theorists such as Geoffrey Hodgson, have been 
alert to these issues. 
 
For those arguing that media globalisation is making national media systems redundant, I 
would say not so fast. A recent collection of essays that I have co-edited, along with Petros 
Iosifidis (City) and Jeanette Steemers (Westminster) is titled Global Media and National 
Policies: The Return of the State (Flew et. al., 2016). In that collection, various authors argue 
the case for the primary dynamics of media continuing to be national, even as the national and 
the transnational increasingly co-exist. As well as the on-going cultural dynamics of audience 
preference for local content where it is readily available, there are the policy dynamics of 
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incumbent media continuing to have strong proximity to national political decision-makers, 
and the ways in which they can promote regulations to maintain a national media space.  
 
Indeed, one of the fastest areas of growth in contemporary media has been the international 
expansion of national broadcasters, with the rise of CCTV, Russia Today, Telesur, Press TV, 
Al-Jazeera and others, alongside expansion of the international operations of the BBC, 
Deutsche Velle, France 24 and NHK. This is associated with the struggle for political 
hegemony in a post-Cold War world, and the idea of cultural soft power through international 
broadcasting being an important arm of a nation’s public diplomacy. At one level, this can be 
seen as media globalisation, but it is a globalisation very much orchestrated by national 
governments, for their own national political purposes. Whether we are in a post-globalisation 
era remains to be seen, but there is much evidence of the continuing centrality of the 
Westphalian system of states.  
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